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INTRODUCTION  
 
The Internet is a relatively new and growing aspect of international political-economic 
affairs. The last 10-15 years have witnessed the frequently controversial emergence and 
development of a new global(ising) institutional landscape for Internet governance. An 
actor keen on expanding its presence on the international political stage, the EU has 
shown itself keen to develop a prominent position in the international institutional 
landscape of the Internet. This short paper provides an outline of some of the main 
findings of a recent body of academic research conducted by the authors aimed at 
explaining the role and significance of the EU as an international actor in Internet 
governance. 
 
Inevitably, the EU’s ability to exert its preferences and influence on Internet governance 
has shown mixed results. Policy activity is most clearly evidenced in three contexts. The 
first context is a general one: as the Internet has increased in global political importance, 
the EU has made a number of general strategic statements outlining its position on the 
evolving landscape and, in the process, establishing itself as an important commentator 
on Internet policy matters. Whilst not exclusively for ‘external’ consumption, these 
statements set out key approaches - and actions informed by them - that the EU is likely 
to pursue in the short to medium term future. The second and third contexts are 
institution-specific. As the paper shows, the EU has engaged to a very significant degree 
with the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), one of the 
earliest and arguably the most high profile global governance body for the Internet to 
have emerged to date. The EU’s presence has also been noteworthy in the newer Internet 
Governance Forum (IGF), a multi-stakeholder deliberative body formed in 2005 and 
whose performance and potential continuation are currently under review. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section outlines a number of key concepts 
which have been utilised to provide a better understanding of the role of the EU in the 
evolving international institutional landscape of the Internet. Thereafter, brief treatment is 
given to a description and explanation of the some of the most prominent Internet policy 
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activities with which the EU has engaged at the global level. Here focus is trained on 
three areas: early action taken by the EU to establish itself in an unfamiliar institutional 
and policy landscape; the degree to which the EU has been able to develop coherent 
policy positions on Internet governance; and the extent to which its involvement in the 
international institutional context of Internet governance has impacted on it 
‘domestically’. The final section of the paper draws together some of the main findings of 
the research conducted to date and suggests a number of areas around which a future 
research agenda might be formulated. 
 
REVIEW OF THEORETICAL APPROACHES  
 
Whilst there is a plethora of work on the role of the US in international regimes and 
institutions, this has not been the case until very recently for the EU (in terms of the 
quantity of work, anyway). There is even less work on the role of the EU in international 
Internet institutions; mainly because of the relative newness of the EU’s activity in this 
area compared to more established regimes and institutions, although much work does 
exist on how the EU has shaped the different dimensions of the global and regional 
Information Society agenda, in particular telecommunications.    
 
Our initial work on this topic (Christou and Simpson 2007a) utilised the regulatory state 
and governance literate in order to answer the question of what the EU was promoting in 
Internet governance at all levels, including that of the international realm. To this end it 
did not theorise or conceptualise the EU’s role as such, but how its internal dynamic (and 
the external context) and identity impacted on the EU’s Internet governance initiatives 
and more specific Directives (e-commerce) and Regulations (dot eu).   
 
Subsequent work (Christou and Simpson 2007b; Christou and Simpson 2008; Christou 
and Simpson 2009; Christou and Simpson 2010a; Christou and Simpson 2010b) sought 
to add to ‘what’ the European Union is promoting normatively and develop ‘how’ and 
‘why’ the EU has acted, and indeed how international institutions have impacted on the 
EU in its construction of Internet governance policy and execution of process.  Inter alia, 
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this work drew extensively from the IR literature that has explored: strategic norm 
manipulation in international institutions (Schimmelfennig 2003) and the broader 
literature that has emerged which conceptualises EU actorness (Bretherton and Vogler 
2006); the EU’s role in international regimes (Smith and Elgström 2008) and 
international organisations (Jørgensen 2009); and the EU as a strategic actor in 
international politics (Smith and Xie 2009). It has also utilised frameworks that 
conceptualise how (i.e. resources, mechanisms and tools available) international 
organisations implement policies, rule or codes of conducts on regional bodies and 
nations states (Verbeek et al 2008); and indeed, literature that has sought to theorise how 
international organizations can shape EU norms, thus focusing on downloading rather 
than uploading (Costa and Jørgensen 2010). 
 
Overall then, our work on Internet governance has sought to explain, understand and 
reflect on:  
 
• The EU’s promotion of governance in international Internet governance 
institutions, where the focus has been on drawing out and attempting to 
characterise the type of governance the EU has favoured. We have, in particular, 
sought to sketch out and provide a conceptual map that encapsulates different 
forms of public and private governance (see Table 1 below from Christou and 
Simpson 2009) in order to capture and uncover the nuance in what the EU has 
promoted over time, and indeed to ascertain if and how the EU’s projections have 
changed over time, and in what direction.  
 
Hierarchical                Non-hierarchical  
 
Regulatory state………………………………………………….............Post-Regulatory State 
 
  ‘Concerted action’ ‘Subcontracting’ ‘Market-based/state 
shadowed self-
regulation’ 
‘Voluntary Action’ 
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Where the state sets 
both formal and 
substantive 
conditions for rule-
making 
 
Governance:  
Public interest 
networks/agencies 
Actor constellation:  
Delegation of public 
functions to public 
actors 
Central authority: 
coercion/bargaining 
Polity: 
Legally binding 
instruments/legal 
framework, 
flexible/rigid 
implementation, 
procedural/material 
regulation, sanctions 
Policy: 
 
Where state 
involvement is limited 
to setting formal 
conditions for rule-
making with private 
actors then shaping the 
content. 
 
Governance:  
Public-private networks 
Actor constellation:  
Delegation of public 
functions to private 
actors 
Central/Dispersed loci 
of authority: 
bargaining, learning  
Polity: 
Legal framework, 
flexible/rigid 
implementation, 
procedural/material 
regulation, 
incentives/sanctions 
Policy: 
Involves industry-
setting, monitoring and 
enforcing standards in 
the knowledge that if it 
fails, state intervention 
could be imminent, that 
is, self-regulation in the 
shadow of the state 
 
Governance:  
Public-private 
networks/communities/
associations 
Actor constellation:  
Dispersed loci of 
authority: Persuasion, 
learning, arguing,  
Polity: 
Soft law, flexible 
implementation, 
procedural regulation, 
incentives 
Policy: 
 
Self-regulation can 
occur in a purely 
voluntary way with no 
direct state stimulus or 
intervention. 
 
Governance:  
Private interest 
networks/communities/
associations 
Actor constellation:  
Market: Persuasion, 
learning, arguing,  
Polity: 
Soft law, flexible 
implementation, 
procedural regulation, 
incentives 
Policy: 
 
Source: Derived from ‘Self-regulation of Digital Media’ (2004); Verhulst and Price (2005); NEWGOV 
(2004); Treib et al (2007)    
 
 
• The EU as an ‘actor’ in international Internet governance institutions. In order to 
understand and explain the EU’s ‘actorness’ and thus influence in the global 
telecommunications and Internet sectors (Christou and Simpson 2010a) , we have 
utilised a broad analytical framework that draws on the literature on EU actorness 
(Bretherton and Vogler 2006; 2008) but also more specific work on the EU in 
international organizations (Jorgensen 2009) and the EU as a strategic actor 
(Smith and Xei 2009). The purpose of using such a framework is to unravel the 
context within which the EU is acting and more specifically, to investigate the 
opportunities that have enabled or constrained EU influence in the external 
environment of events, ideas and power; the capability of the EU to act 
(formulating and agreeing policy) in terms of the EU internal context and by 
virtue of its own identity, and finally; flowing from opportunity and capability, 
the EU’s ability to influence and shape (or not) governance in relation to the 
Internet and more recently, telecommunications. 
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• The EU’s mode of engagement (rational strategic/normative) in international 
Internet governance institutions. This has drawn from theories in IR which have 
sort to analyse actor behaviour in international institutions and more specific work 
that theorises on how the EU behaves in international regimes. Both, essentially, 
draw on the ‘institutionalism’ literature (rationalist and sociological).  The 
following concepts have provided the basis for our analysis: 
 
Strategic Mode - whereby the EU acts through a logic of consequences (bargaining 
mode and hard power). Such an approach is focused on enhancing actor information, 
reducing uncertainty and mediating preferences. Rules are then established through 
negotiation, which members are expected to adhere to, with ‘the possibility of 
defection if the calculus shifts or if conditions in the broader global arena make this 
apparently profitable’ (Smith and Elgstrøm, 2008: 6). Much work on principal-agent 
dynamics in international organizations has been underpinned by the rationalist logic, 
with a focus in particular on the control and cooperative aspects within this 
relationship; and especially the extent and conditions under which ‘agents’, such as 
the European Commission, can act as policy entrepreneurs. 
 
Normative Mode – whereby the EU acts through a logic of appropriateness (problem-
solving mode and soft power. This approach takes the focus away from the simple 
projection of preferences by actors and how such preferences can be secured through 
rational calculus, to ask questions of ‘the terms on which actors enter into regimes, 
the ways in which they construct them or construct themselves within them, and the 
ways in which regimes may lose their strength because of an erosion of underlying 
principles such as trust, legitimacy and shared expectations among their members 
(Smith and Elgstrøm, 2008: 10). Also significant is the transformative effect of 
institutions – again neglected by rationalist approaches with a focus on institutions as 
management or regulatory devices and where preferences remain fixed. Here, much 
work has focused on how actors can use international fora and other arenas to 
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advocate, legitimise and diffuse alternative norms through communicative rather than 
coercive action (Keck and Sikkink 1998). 
 
Rhetorical Action – the instrumental use of argument to persuade others of one’s 
claims. Rhetorical action, therefore, involves a process of rationally driven norm 
manipulation. Very importantly, those actors with preferences which are in line with, 
but not identical to, institutional norms have a chance to ‘add cheap legitimacy to 
their position’ (Schimmelfennig, 2001: 63).  
 
• The role of the EU (leader/mediator-adjudicator/broker) in international Internet 
governance institutions. A leadership role can be defined as the ability of an actor 
to shape and direct others towards its desired goal over a period of time (Underdal 
1994: 178). Important in terms of leadership traits is the leader’s vision and ability 
to persuade others (followers) of that vision in the appropriate institutional 
context. This latter point is significant as the role the EU plays, as already stated, 
is contextually determined with actors ‘behaving in the way they think is 
appropriate in the particular context at hand’ (Smith and Elgström 2008: 17). The 
EU can also play the role of mediator or bridge-builder in international fora, the 
main traits of which are an ability to build trust and consensus in order to arrive at 
solutions that cannot be found if other actors are left to their own devices. In this 
sense, the EU does not necessarily have to be a leader to be effective; it can also 
be successful as an actor that can offer alternatives on which others can 
compromise (Smith and Elgström 2008: 18-19; Elgström 2003, 2006, 2007).   
 
• The impact of international organisations on the EU in terms of policy 
implementation and norm diffusion. The work on policy implementation focuses 
on how IO’s can enforce rules, legislation and codes through: 
a) Coercive means such as monitoring and sanctions  
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b) A managerial perspective, which essentially stresses problem solving and capacity 
building, rule interpretation and transparency. The dominant mode here ‘is that of actors 
engaged in a cooperative venture, in which performance that seems for some reason 
unsatisfactory represents a problem to be solved by mutual consultation and analysis, 
rather than an offence to be punished’ (Chayes and Chayes, 1995: 303; 1993)  
 
c) Normative means – here, the authority of IOs is a vital resource. Power is, thus, not 
a matter of material but rather of intersubjective factors. The authority of IOs flows from 
the control over information and expertise (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999: 708) but also 
because of the fact that IOs are perceived as rational, neutral and impartial (see also Boli, 
1999). The perception that IOs are rational and impartial actors can in part be attributed 
to the laws, rules, procedures that form the basis of their existence but is also reinforced 
by IOs themselves who ‘present themselves as impersonal, technocratic, and neutral – as 
not exercising power but instead of serving others’ (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999: 708). 
  
The work on the influence of international institutions utilises conceptual work (see 
Jørgensen and Costa, 2010) on mechanisms of influence and facilitating conditions, as 
well as measuring impact, the latter of which draws heavily from the well-established 
Europeanization literature which posits four main types of impact:  inertia (lack of 
influence by the international institution), absorption (some influence of the international 
institution on the EU, but only up to the point of adaptation), transformation (indicates a 
deeper influence of international institutions on the EU, both in terms of policies, policy 
making, behavior and institutions) and retrenchment (is a situation in which the EU reacts 
against a particular international institution, at least for some time) (Radaelli, 2002: 116).    
 
LOCATIONS, PERFORMANCE AND EXPLANATION 
 
Early International Institutionalisation of Internet Governance – Establishing the EU’s 
Presence From a ‘Standing Start’ 
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The growth of the Internet until the mid to late 1990s took place, for the most part, under 
the EU’s international ‘policy radar’. A number of reasons lie behind this. First, and most 
obviously, the Internet emerged outside the EU. Whilst there is strong evidence that the 
EU was monitoring carefully developments in US audiovisual and telecommunications 
policy, not least the global ambitions of both, the development of the Internet was 
arguably viewed with passing, rather than strategic, interest (European Commission 
1994). This quickly changed by the late 1990s, by which time negotiations on what 
eventually came to into being as ICANN were in full swing. Second, the EU’s 
technological perspective on future electronic communications networks was articulated 
in projects around so-called Integrated Broadband Communications, whose protocols 
were different from those that underpinned the Internet’s functionality (Lieb 2002). 
Thirdly, the EU had concentrated a considerable degree of policy energy through the 
1980s and early 1990s on its own internal internationalisation project in electronic 
network communications, focused on broadcasting (see Harcourt 2005; Humphreys 
1996) and, in particular, telecommunications (see Thatcher 2001; Goodman 2006). The 
‘Eu-isation’ of both these areas was a far from uncontroversial project which highlighted 
many of the core issues at the heart of the wider European integration project. 
 
In the process leading to the creation of ICANN, the EU was, therefore, something of an 
outsider. An illustration of this was the rejection, by the US government, of the 
International Ad-Hoc Committee’s proposal for a global Internet addressing body to be 
headquartered in Switzerland, largely due to the presence of the International 
Telecommunication Union. The proposed IAHC arrangement would arguably have 
presented the EU with a considerably less challenging institutional environment than the 
one that eventually transpired. Here, in the subsequent negotiations that led to the US 
headquartered ICANN, the EU, despite significant lobbying efforts, played a minor role 
compared to the US government and US-based Internet technical interests (see Mueller 
2002). Two exceptions to this were the creation of a Governmental Advisory Committee 
(GAC) to ICANN and a Uniform Dispute Resolution Procedure (the latter drawing on the 
practice of the World Intellectual Property Organization), both of which the EU was in 
favour. Once established, however, the EU made strong efforts to create a prominent 
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presence and position of influence for itself in ICANN. These efforts proved to a 
considerable degree successful. The EU drew on its growing international policy 
reputation in electronic communications, producing a landmark statement on Internet 
governance which declared dissatisfaction, inter alia, with the perceived dominance of 
US interests in ICANN and urging close monitoring of the private interest governance of 
the Corporation that was taking shape operationally (European Council of Ministers 
2000). However, rather than reject ICANN, the EU took significant pains to engage with 
it. In this process, there is evidence that the EU employed rhetorical action to manipulate 
key ICANN norms for its own strategic benefit (Christou and Simpson 2007).  
 
First, in respect of ICANN’s self-regulatory modus-operandi accompanied with an 
advisory-only presence for states exercised through the GAC, the EU argued for a shift in 
the direction of co-regulation. It is important to stress that, by this, the EU did not wish to 
replace self-regulation by joint state Internet regulation at the global level. Rather, it 
wished to see a techno-functional system in place, whose fundamental public policy 
parameters were guarded and guided by joint state action through a more influential, 
though still relatively light touch, GAC. As the first decade of ICANN proceeded, this 
has indeed transpired, though for more prosaic reasons than the arguments and suasion of 
the EU. Most clearly, the realisation among ICANN’s technical elite of the public policy 
and political ramifications of the Corporation’s work and the political complexity arising 
thereby explains the change. 
 
Second, at a much more functional level, at the inception of ICANN, the EU moved 
quickly to secure for itself a legitimate presence on the GAC through putting forward a 
proposal to create its own Internet Top Level Domain, dot eu. Through this action, the 
EU aimed to manipulate, though not radically, the existing naming system norm of 
ICANN where domains were either ‘generic’ (related, broadly speaking to organisational 
entities and activities of various kinds) or ‘country code’ (based on single nation state 
identities). Through securing strong support from its own ‘domestic’ business 
community, and complying, for the most part, with the governance modus operandi of 
TLDs prescribed by ICANN, the EU was able to secure dot eu as the first 
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‘internationalised’ country code TLD. As a consequence, the European Commission 
obtained a ‘legitimate’ presence on the ICANN’s GAC, creating something of a ‘policy 
bridgehead’ to try to influence the evolution of the Corporation thereafter (see Christou 
and Simpson 2006). 
 
The EU as a Coherent Policy Actor in the Internet’s International Institutional 
Landscape  
The EU’s considerable policy activity in the Internet’s international institutional 
landscape has, its achievements aside, also shown up the distinct difficulty which it has 
faced in securing and presenting a coherent policy position on Internet governance 
matters. The EU’s intra-institutional mechanics provide the route to understanding the 
problem (Christou and Simpson 2010a). At Council of Ministers level an important early 
landmark was the establishment of the Internet Informal Group (IIG), influenced to a 
considerable degree by the European Commission’s then Information Society 
Directorate-General. The IIG contains Member State GAC members and is chaired by the 
Commission. Importantly, it serves as a discussion and information sharing forum only. 
More formally, the EU created the High Level Group on Internet Governance (HLGIG) 
to develop strategic policy positions among Member States.  However, it is important to 
note that the HLGIG is under no formal procedural requirement to coordinate Member 
State positions. In practice, the HLGIG has acted in instances where it considers it 
important that the EU aims to put forward a single coherent position. Key policy 
examples here have been in respect of the creation of the Joint Project Agreement (JPA) 
in 2005 between the US government and ICANN and the 2010 review of the Internet 
Governance Forum (IGF) (authors’ interview 2010). This lack of legal remit has created 
both internal coordination and external perception problems for the EU. The HLGIG has 
‘always been wary of the Commission driving the Internet agenda’ (authors’ interview, 
2010). For EU negotiating partners and observers, there has frequently been difficulty in 
establishing precisely what the official EU position is on a particular Internet policy 
matter. A further complication arises from the intervention of the EU Presidency, which 
has articulated the official EU position at key junctures, such as at the 2005 World 
Summit on the Information Society and in respect of the recently agreed Affirmation of 
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Commitments between the US government and ICANN, effectively replacing the 
aforementioned JPA. The EU’s lack of coherence has also meant that there is no formal 
EU representative on ICANN’s GAC. Interestingly, the European Commission sits on the 
GAC in respect of its responsibilities related to the governance of dot eu only (authors’ 
interview 2010). The GAC also contains representation from individual EU Member 
States, creating further scope for the articulation of divergent opinions, unlikely to serve 
the interests of presenting a united EU front to institutional counterparts.  
 
Impact of the Internet’s International Institutional Landscape on the EU 
A key aspect of the EU’s engagement with the international institutional landscape of the 
Internet concerns the degree of impact which has occurred on the development of the 
EU’s own perspective on the Internet. Very much an under-researched area of EU 
Internet policy, a significant finding has been that the degree of impact of an institution 
and its policies developed at the global level tends to be in part a function of the degree to 
which the EU has been able to assert itself in the policy context in question: impact is 
thus a dialectical process (Christou and Simpson 2010b). The European Commission has 
also been a key entity in any processes of policy absorption that the EU has been 
involved in. On the one hand, it has been able to act as an amplifier of international 
Internet policy agendas ‘domestically’. Through its work in proposing new policy 
positions and in producing regular assessments of the development of the Internet 
governance landscape the Commission has functioned as a promoter and an ‘educator’, 
internally and externally. On the other hand, the Commission has played a key role as a 
policy filtration agent, in the process allowing the EU to adapt, where it felt necessary, 
global policy agendas to the idiosyncrasies of its own domestic governance system. This 
is clearly illustrated in the case of the dot eu TLD, whose system of governance, as noted 
above, bears the key hallmarks of  ICANN’s not-for-profit, private interest self-regulation 
but is also framed by a set of public policy rules the guardianship of which lies with the 
Commission acting in the public interest (Christou and Simpson 2006).  
 
Two further relatively prominent examples illustrate the significant impact of the 
international institutional landscape of the Internet on the EU. First, as noted above, once 
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particularly wary of the modus operandi of the GAC in respect of its relationship with the 
ICANN Board, evidence suggests the EU is now much more comfortable with the idea 
that ICANN undertakes the day-today running of the Internet and the GAC gives policy 
advice to it when appropriate. This has no doubt been helped by the fact that ICANN is 
much more willing to defer to the GAC’s position on Internet governance matters with a 
strong public policy dimension (Kleinwachter 2008). This notwithstanding, there is also 
some evidence of an ongoing difference of opinion between the European Commission 
and the HLGIG on the matter (European Commission 2009 and authors’ interviews 2009; 
2010), the Commission being much more critical of the GAC. 
 
Second, there is considerable evidence that the multi-stakeholder model of the IGF has 
been accepted, and to a significant degree adopted domestically, by the EU. It is 
important to note that multi-stakeholderism does not have any real policy roots in the EU 
political landscape. Yet, the HLGIG, in its 2009 Hearing on the Future of Internet 
Governance, expressed support for the continuation of the IGF, after the 2010 review of 
the latter. The European Parliament has called for the creation of a European IGF. 
Though the latter has not as yet been created, there is some evidence of institutional 
mimicry of the IGF within the EU. The European Dialogue on Internet Governance 
(EuroDIG) is a multi-stakeholder platform for the discussion of Internet governance 
matters. At national level, France, Germany and the UK have established national level 
IGFs. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS  
 
Work on the EU and Internet governance is in its infancy, with much remaining 
unexplored both in terms of the internal policy making and the EU’s subsequent 
performance in the relatively young international institutions that ‘govern’ the Internet. 
The evidence thus far suggests that whilst the EU has certainly, through its projections 
and communications on Internet governance, declared itself a leader, its performance has 
pointed to real constraints in fulfilling such a role.  
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The EU was not able to develop any kind of coherent position on the Internet before it 
became a high profile global communications policy matter. However, the EU, through 
the European Commission in particular in the early period of intervention, proved 
enthusiastic and relatively adept at exploiting policy opportunities which arose. However, 
unlike in telecommunications, uncertainty married to the perceived need to react to policy 
developments which were viewed with some degree of concern, left the EU and its 
Member States ‘on the back foot’.  
Since the late 1990s, the EU has aimed to articulate and establish its interests in relevant 
global institutional contexts from a position of relative weakness, certainly compared to 
that experienced in the telecommunications sector. The result has inevitably been one of 
partial success. A major constraint has been the relative power differential and key policy 
differences experienced viz-a-viz the US. There are, however, signs that the two parties, 
in particular with the new Obama administration, are much more aligned in their 
preferences for future Internet governance than in the past. The EU has gained policy 
ground, assisted by significant uncertainty and some turbulence in the development of 
global Internet policy agendas, which has involved contestation of ICANN, in particular 
and, lately, the IGF.  
The EU has, however, struggled in the past to project a clear, cogent message on Internet 
governance given the informal nature of its internal policy process for constructing 
positions on Internet governance, and the opportunities this afforded those in the 
Commission with their own political agenda to influence global proceedings. The result 
was often multiple messages, multiple EU representatives in different global fora and 
confusion over what the ‘real’ EU position was. This did not imbue the EU with the 
visibility or credibility required to be as influential as it could in many instances. More 
recently, with a change of Commissioner that seems to have taken a less assertive role 
(indeed she has been more interested in telecommunications, but this is perhaps natural 
given her previous competition policy background), and agreement on the Lisbon Treaty, 
there has evolved an internal mechanism that is resulting in more consensual policy-
making and the projection of coherent EU positions in matters of crucial importance for 
the future of Internet governance (the IGF and the AoC). However, given the lack of 
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legal mandate underpinning the policy process, this does not preclude individuals and 
institutions from projecting their own autonomous positions in the future without 
reference to the informal mechanism established through the HLGIG. Moreover, the lack 
of formal EU representation will also be problematic if the EU has the ambition to be 
taken seriously as a ‘leader’ and coherent actor in Internet governance, beyond its own 
self-projections. Addressing these two issues would certainly alleviate the problem of 
identifying first, the ‘official’ EU position (and the process through which it is 
constructed), and second, who speaks and negotiates for the EU on Internet governance.              
 
In terms of future directions and future research in this area, then it is clear that there is 
still much to be done in order to enrich the existing work. For us, this includes:  
 
*The perceptions of others on the EU’s role, performance and influence (relevance). Who 
else considers the EU a leader within the international Internet milieu in which it 
operates?  
*‘Informal governance’ and how this impacts on the EU construction and 
projection/negotiation of positions in global internet institutions. To what extent does this 
help or hinder the EU’s performance and leadership ambitions in different contexts? Will 
the Lisbon Treaty make any difference to which EU actor will represent and negotiate for 
the EU in this area?  
*Problematizing negotiation and diplomacy. How can we move beyond ‘modes’ to 
specific tactics and strategies employed by EU actors in deliberations and negotiations?   
*Policy learning/transfer and institutional mimicry, in particular with regard to the impact 
of governance concepts such as ‘multi-stakeholderism’ but also policy ideas from 
international Internet organisations such as the IGF and ICANN, especially on key issues 
such as cyber security. 
*Comparative ‘communications’ analysis. What can we learn across the EU 
communications sector about international performance and interaction?  What can we 
learn through comparing the EU approach to other major actors’ such as the US?  
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